# Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns and Recurring Themes

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The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not purport t the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense or any other government of agency.- Editor

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Marine major general discussing his role in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia co aren't prepared for these operations very well." An Army colonel recalling his s Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti stated, " The single hardest thing that I've experience was to come up with an OOTW [ operations other than war] campaign pla Forces lieutenant colonel, generalizing from his own experience in Haiti, implor anticipate " different environments" in which they would be required to perform little or no training. A Ranger lieutenant had learned the same lesson several y during Operation Just Cause when he engaged in night combat operations at Rio Ha as it turned out. At dawn, he was informed his platoon was to move out immediate small Panamanian town. He later conceded that he had not clearly understood, nor do, any of the half- dozen tasks given him as a part of this new, highly sensiti These brief examples and countless others like them illustrate the difficulty ma officers have in coming to grips with unorthodox military operations- operations generally regarded as the military's primary focus and traditional role of fight OOTW, the current doctrinal terminology for such nontraditional undertakings, co ranging " from support to US, state and local governments, disaster relief, nati interdiction to peacekeeping, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, evacuation and peace enforcement." 1 Other nontraditional operations include hum strikes and raids, antiterrorist activities and, as some would argue, overseas i maintain, restore or change the status quo in the target area. Some intervention operations, often intense, but usually too brief to qualify as " general," or ev That US officers often find themselves adrift in such operations is not without these undertakings are nothing new; they have not been spawned or even accelerat commentary would suggest, by the post- Cold War environment. Rather, the US mili these nontraditional, unorthodox operations throughout its history, far more oft conventional warfare, as depicted in the figure on page 52.3 Figure

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The historical record is readily available for any officer to study. Furthermore decades now, there has been a growing body of doctrine that discusses nontraditi within the framework of the terminology in vogue: stability operations and count 1960s, low- intensity conflict in the 1980s, and operations other than war, mili war, and stability and support operations today. 4 Why is it then that the body lack of preparation for such operations continues to mount?

The answer is complex, the reasons numerous. One significant cause is the variou US officers approach the history of their own profession with respect to these o there are officers who are convinced that, for one reason or another, military h to their current concerns and operations, whether conventional or unorthodox. Wh

gleaned from history is not worth the time expended studying the past.
Analogies
Others do consult the historical record, but selectively, often regarding anythi
World War II- or as the years creep by, Vietnam- as " ancient history," and ther
for today's military professional. It is not, they acknowledge, that there is no
the Second Seminole War of 1836 to 1842; Captain William Clarke Quantrill's expl
War or the Reconstruction of the South that followed; the Philippine- American W
century; or the Sandino Affair in Nicaragua. They merely argue that whatever val
from these distant episodes can be derived with greater profit from more recent
Perusing contemporary history is often a priority for officers engaged in or abo
nontraditional operation. With the exceptions noted below, the search for releva
focuses on the most recent operations- usually only one or two- that appear to h
with the current one. In 1988, a staff officer helping to plan what would eventu
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invasion of Panama combed the after- action reports ( AAR) on the 1983 intervent
general officer managing the ongoing crisis in Panama for most of two years prio
Cause garnered insights from a book on the US intervention in the Dominican Repu
US troops toppled the regime of Manuel Antonio Noriega in December 1989, Just Ca
civil- military extension, Promote Liberty, became the reference points for futu
operations. Thus, when the 10th Mountain Division ( Light) [ 10th MD ( L)] prepa
Somalia, its staff contacted people with information on the Panamanian crisis. A
officer going into Port- au- Prince discovered a monograph on Promote Liberty th
idea of what duties he might be called on to perform in stabilizing Haiti.
Besides propinquity, personal experience also enters into the search for relevan
commander's memories of his experience as a lieutenant in the Dominican crisis g
which to reflect as he prepared to take his paratroopers into Grenada nearly 20
10th MD ( L) deployed to Haiti in 1994, it had its own experience as the quick r
fresh in mind.
The selection of historical precedents can also be based on the previous deploym
target area, at least within recent memory. Thus, it was only natural for Marine
1982 to take note of the situation their counterparts a generation before had en
1958. However, forces deploying to Haiti for Op- eration Uphold Democracy appare
attempt to study in detail what US Marines had done in that country from 1915 to
ancient history. 5
Finally, the experiences of foreign countries in seemingly analogous operations
albeit on an infrequent basis. US policy makers coping with the growing insurgen
early 1960s turned to recent British efforts in Malaya and to the suppression of
Philippines as successful and applicable examples of counterinsurgency.
As these examples suggest, the search for historical precedents by units set to
systematic or comprehensive. Rather, given the press of other requirements, it i
haphazard, superficial and limited in scope. To be sure, attempts to relate only
operations to the current or pending one can yield relevant insights and useful
there are shortcomings to this selective use of historical records. For one, the
might have offered more relevant experience and guidelines than the ones consult
more critical, shortcoming concerns the general caution that must be used in app
past experience to present concerns. The process of reasoning by analogy, as the
indicates, assumes that if two or more things agree with each other in some resp
agree in others as well. Yet, while two military operations may be similar, they
History, in reality, does not repeat itself. Each occurrence or phenome- non is
accepted, then just as promptly ignored, by many who study history. When similar
to exist between past and current operations do not in fact exist, the result ca
even false, analogies.
Determining what is a false analogy is no easy endeavor. Take, for example, the
force protection measures in both Haiti and Bosnia. Presumably one cause of the

some have called the Somalia Syndrome. The tragic fire fight in Mogadishu on 3 O the perceived success or failure of US policy to the number of American casualti of the fire fight, force protection issues, always of critical importance, becam for several commanders deploying to Haiti and Bosnia. In both of these peace ope 3 of 12 3/ 11/ 98 12: 32 PM
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protection measures commanders imposed on certain units were so stringent that, well under way, fellow officers began to question whether the combat posture or the troops was not, in fact, hindering accomplishment of assigned missions. This resolved, nor has the issue of whether the analogy the Somalian experience provi false. 6

Hindsight makes the task of identifying facile and false analogies easier by all disinterested look at how and why a historical example was chosen and employed a it had. Historians call this critical analysis. Decision makers often refer to i Vietnam, for example, the limitations of the Munich analogy were much more appar to the World War II generation of civilian and mil- itary leaders who accepted w consequences of " appeasement" and who, during the Cold War's first 20 years, fo critical military and foreign policy decisions based, in part, on that reading o For leaders who must make quick decisions based to some degree on historical ana professors Richard Neustadt and Ernest May suggest that the first step toward de of a historical example or guideline is to compare " then" and " now" by listing which the example in question is similar to the current situation and the ways i While no guarantee that a facile or false analogy will be discovered, the step a method for determining if a historical parallel will prove useful in clarifying options. 7

The point to be made here is: Use historical records as part of the preparation and May advise, broaden the search for historical par- allels ( the more the bet ancient history might prove relevant. More comprehensive historical research tur and analogies to choose from, thus broadening the experiential data base and les about to embark on nontraditional operations. The process of selecting which of are applicable and how they can be applied to the current operation should itsel critical analysis and innovative thinking, both of which can be put to good use OOTW.

Patterns and Themes

A more comprehensive approach to the historical record offers another benefit. A various case studies is accumulated, it will begin to reveal certain patterns an have characterized OOTW and, in many ways, set them apart from conventional oper Contributing authors of generalized field manuals tend more than most officers t of historical information and to address patterns and themes in the doctrine the while grounded in history, is not a history lesson and is not promulgated to pro narrative or analysis of what has actually happened. Indeed, OOTW AARs often emp tremendous gap between doctrinal guidelines and what a particular situation dema patterns and recurring themes may be discussed in doctrine, a solid appreciation generally acquired only through experience or through a study of the past.

A comprehensive presentation of OOTW patterns and themes requires a separate vol possible, in the space remaining here, to hint at what such a presentation might the following, but by no means inclusive, topics:

Nontraditional environments.
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The enemy.
Noncombatants.
The political- military dimension.

Changing missions and mission creep.
Operational constraints, including rules of engagement ( ROE).
The role of combat troops.
Cross- cultural interaction.
Although listed separately, these topics should not be regarded in isolation. Th interrelated. 8
Nontraditional environment. Generally, US military forces participating in unort operations will be inserted into complex, unstable, even chaotic situations that fraught with ambiguity and in which US political leaders want to " hold the line without resorting to war. In this environment, US troops will confront a broad s a variety of locations. One theme linking this diversity is a negative one: rare of conventional combat between enemy forces operating along what appears on a ma front. The OOTW " battlefield" is more likely to be characterized by the nonline the absence of a clearly defined- or, at very least, conventionally oriented- en noncombatants, whether indigenous population, representatives of humanitarian an governmental and nongovernmental organizations, reporters, political authorities The preferred responses to the challenges presented generally fall within the re combat, although force or a military presence might be essential for furthering interested parties. Not surprisingly, military concerns are generally subordinat political considerations. US troops, in essence, are present in a supporting rol The enemy. The ramifications of working in this nontraditional environment are w longstanding counsel to remain open- minded and flexible, officers with a conven wed to " doing it by the book" can experience a high degree of frustration in OO are problems associated with the traditional concept of the " enemy." In peace o us, US forces must demonstrate that they are neutral and impartial. Yet, in situ Lebanon in both 1958 and 1983 and in the Dominican Republic in 1965, some of the for power may engage in fire fights with US forces or at least be sniping at the reasons those doing the shooting may not be classified as the enemy lest militar the detriment of the peace process. These political calculations are often lost coming under fire, tend to define those trying to kill them as the enemy. The in disorienting and demoralizing effects.
Conversely, in situations where there is no hostile force, there may be a tenden conventionally oriented officers and policy makers to create one. One Marine Cor saw this " need to have an enemy" as a fatal flaw in the military's approach. Re strategy advocated by Ambassador Robert Oakley of " don't make any enemies, don' Somalis, let the Somalis arrive at their own solution, stay in touch with them a a new, potentially disastrous approach called for US forces to " isolate, margin General Mohammed Farrah Aideed, the most powerful faction leader in Somalia. The designated " enemy" led directly to the 3 October fire fight and subsequent US w country. 9
Noncombatants. Almost as perplexing as dealing with hostile forces in OOTW is de
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interact with the numerous noncombatants almost sure to inundate the scene. To b local inhabitants who may be friendly, hostile or indifferent to the presence of soil. How to behave toward the indigenous population, what signals and messages protect the force without alienating the people the troops were probably sent to of these and similar considerations require careful analysis and sophisticated r Other noncombatants will belong to formal organizations, many of which have thei military's perspective, very different agenda, procedures and concerns. US gover performing various mandated activities compose one such group. Where these US of to work closely with their military counterparts, friction can arise if each par how the other operates. Turf battles can also erupt when the issue of who is in established at higher levels. Close cooperation and coordination are also requir necessary tasks are carried out and efforts are not duplicated.

In certain nontraditional operations, various nongovernmental organizations ( NG volunteer organizations ( PVOs), both US and foreign, are likely to be present. the military mission's success will depend on establishing a close working relat groups, despite obstacles posed by the presence of mutual suspicion and differen structure and motivations, decision- making processes and execution or implement Somalia, US commanders chafed when certain humanitarian agencies ignored basic s hired armed members of different factions to protect them, and, in general, made military command. The consequent friction, however, did not remove the need to w starving people.

The interaction between US forces and the media is also a potential, even probab Since the mid- 1960s, military leaders have generally regarded the news media in reporters are often seen as interfering with operations, violating operations se lives of US troops in some cases and, when all is said and done, presenting to t biased, distorted and inaccurate account of what happened. Yet, as recent operat the news media, for better or worse, will be well represented wherever US troops numbers. One need only recall the incongruous image of Marines coming ashore at being met by a mob of reporters and a bank of bright camera lights. Similarly, A Port- au- Prince were seen on television trying to secure the airport as reporte Delivery of humanitarian aid in Somalia was disrupted when automobiles driven by and out of the convoys.

Upon hearing these and similar stories, many officers have sworn that, in simila will take whatever measures necessary to prevent reporters from interfering with Officers who make such vows, of course, are suffering from the delusion that the determining military policy toward the media in their sectors. Furthermore, whil reporters and, in general, demonstrating contempt for the news media may prove h the officers involved, such actions can also prove counterproductive for the mis news media have more impact than most other agencies on how an operation is perc world. In light of that power, a more productive approach than open hostility to scene is to recognize why they are there and what they want, to disseminate as m possible, to be as forthright as possible ( that is, do not give the impression embarrassing information), to allow reporters access to places and troops withou operations security and, in general, appear accommodating while recognizing that military and those of the media do not have to coincide. General H. Norman Schwa

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handling of reporters during the Gulf War should not be lost on officers engaged

The political- military dimension. Besides NGOs, PVOs, and the media, US officer will often have to work closely with a variety of political authorities: nationa country in which the operation is taking place, the US ambassador or a president representative. In some cases, a ranking civilian on the scene may be in charge All of this raises issues about chains of command and who answers to whom. In so commanders and their troops have been placed under foreign officers and, in at l under a foreign government. In other cases, mission success has hinged on the US ranking US commander's ability to establish a harmonious working relationship.

One negative example may illustrate this last point. When the first US Marines l 1958, they came ashore in battalion strength south of Beirut. Waiting for the ba beach were military attaches from the US embassy with instructions for the lieut his men on the landing craft, move to the Port of Beirut, and come ashore there. from the south ran the risk of a confrontation with the Lebanese army, the only the country together. The Marine commander refused to comply, arguing that his c back to the ships at sea. In plain words, it was not the ambassador's place to g later, this officer's force found itself muzzle- to- muzzle with the Lebanese ar of the ambassador, the senior US officer in the theater and the Lebanese army co fire fight that would have had disastrous consequences for the US mission to pre takeover of the country and restore peace and stability. One positive point came

following the incident, the ambassador and the senior US commander established a
that became a model of political- military cooperation and coordination. 11
Changing missions and " mission creep." The political- military ramifications of
operations are widespread. When the US government commits military personnel to
undertaking that may affect the nation's security and the president's prestige,
will assume a high degree of political sensitivity. Commanders on the scene can
and directives from the White House, State Department and Pentagon. To the exten
situation is extremely dynamic and fluid, political guidance aimed at achieving
frequently to keep pace. This runs counter to traditional military thinking that
given clearly defined missions and then be left to carry them out without change
interference from political authorities.
The 1965 US intervention in the Dominican Republic demonstrates the impact a dyn
sensitive situation can have on military calculations. The original mission seem
the fall of the country to communist- led rebels. As US marines and paratroopers
of Santo Domingo, their officers assumed that they would be allowed to accomplis
combat operations. Limited combat did succeed in isolating the bulk of the rebel
military victory they sought, but before US troops could finish them off, Presid
decided to seek a political settlement to which all but the most extreme Dominic
party. At that point, a combat operation became a peace operation that passed th
each accompanied by changes in the military mission and associated tasks. The US
Lieutenant General Bruce Palmer, accepted the fact that in a situation " more po
" is inevitable that Washington is going to take direct control." 12 A subordina
Airborne Division commander was not so accommodating. His continued advocacy of
solution compelled Palmer to have him removed from the country.
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Closely related to changing missions and tasks is the concept " mission creep,"
used to describe an age- old phenomenon. In some nontraditional operations, the
remain the same, but in pursuing it, commanders may be forced to take on additio
Mission creep is currently portrayed as a negative phenomenon that can be elimin
planning and careful analysis. There is some validity to this reasoning, but gen
creep accrues more to the logic of a dynamic situation in which the success of t
depends on picking up additional missions. In describing his experience in Somal
bemoaned the amount of mission creep he experienced, but his narrative made it c
no choice but to pick up the additional missions if they hoped to accomplish the
providing security to humanitarian relief efforts. 13 Poor staff work and capric
blame- only reality and logic. Thus, rather than announce in advance that there
during a given operation, it is best simply to be prepared for it and make the n
it occurs.
Operational constraints. Since the military generally assumes a supporting role
operations, few political leaders will allow it a free hand in determining how a
conducted. In an effort to avoid violence or escalation, political authorities a
may impose operational constraints on the troops involved. These may take the fo
limits, activities that are forbidden and so forth. For example, in Lebanon in 1
considerations forbade US forces from entering the Basta, a center of antigovern
source of sniper fire against the US soldiers and Marines. In the two- year cris
Just Cause, US troops pulling guard duty or going on patrol were not allowed to
chambered in their M- 16s lest a breakdown in fire discipline result in a shooti
Noriega the " moral high ground."
Perhaps the best- publicized operational con- straints are ROE- guidelines that
they may defend themselves and the degree of force they can employ in doing so.
combat operations, ROE often contain admonitions about using minimal force and a
indiscriminate fire and " collateral damage." In OOTW, ROE are usually even more
of certain weapons might be prohibited in built- up urban areas for fear of star
troops might be instructed to initiate a series of intermediary steps before emp

threatening situation.
ROE vary from operation to operation, and in most cases, troops trained to close forces using everything in their inventory of tactics and equipment will adjust much difficulty. But there have been exceptions. To begin with, ROE may change f operation's course. ROE may also differ from one location to another at any poin these ROE aspects can create uncertainty among the troops involved as to what ru where. There have also been cases in which ROE imposed unacceptable constraints 1965 US intervention in the Dominican Republic, ROE prohibited US forces from fi shooting at them unless US positions were in danger of being overrun. This restr to declaring open season on US troops by rebel snipers, a condition that caused frustration and demoralization among the force. In Panama during the two- year c Cause, US forces doing guard duty were instructed to challenge armed intruders v chambering a round or opening fire. Field officers, especially Marines who lived memory of the Beirut bombing, objected that the ROE unnecessarily placed their m An interesting point regarding ROE in both the Dominican intervention and Panama constraints were not imposed by political authorities on reluctant military comm 8 of 12 3/ 11/ 98 12: 32 PM
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in each case were promulgated by military commanders who, while certainly follow guidance, truly believed the constraints were necessary and appropriate for miss That troops in the field held a different view was a challenge for small- unit l performing liaison duties in higher headquarters.
The role of combat troops. Nontraditional operations often require combat units. combat is a prelude to OOTW; in others, the threat of combat may permeate the op event, units involved will have to adjust and adapt not only to restrictive ROE will be called on to perform. Virtually every nontraditional operation case stud is replete with a litany of complaints that the troops were not prepared or trai noncombat tasks assigned to them. Such tasks have included distributing food, ma collecting money for weapons, serving as military police, quelling civil disturb garbage, administering to cities and towns, providing a " presence," reassuring negotiating with civic leaders, arbitrating between contending factions, rebuild escorting VIPs, just to name a few. The " warrior" mind- set so essential for co source of anger, confusion, frustration and failure when applied unmodified to O mind, three points need to be made:
Staff officers planning combat operations should not ignore OOTW aspects of thei just as OOTW planners cannot afford to ignore possible combat operations.
Combat troops should be prepared for the variety of noncombat tasks they will in on to perform in OOTW. Whether they should train for these tasks is a controvers morale and efficiency dictate that they should at least be briefed about adjustm to make.
Combat unit commanders should recognize that a conventional mind- set or warrior be highly inappropriate, even counterproductive, to the task at hand and may nee nontraditional operations. 14
What is required, in short, is adaptability. As one general put it, " Rigid mili and not innovative does not apply; it gets you in more trouble." 15
Cross- cultural interaction. Perhaps the most difficult adjustment troops must m area's culture. On this point, the study of history is critical. It reveals to o arose, together with the complexity and nuances of that situation. Of no less im addressing cultural issues history can prepare officers for the society they wil actions culturally acceptable in solving the problem at hand.
Ethnocentrism and cultural arrogance often accompany US troops into foreign coun Lansdale, a proponent of counterinsurgency in the Philippines and Vietnam, once American beliefs into these Asian struggles." So, too, did a Marine general goin was ill- prepared at first to negotiate with clan and faction leaders imbued wit responsibility as opposed to the sense of individual responsibility found in the

cultural diversity the world has known since ancient times, history can help off non- Western societies, interact with people within those societies and adapt to ways that will facilitate rather than impede mission accomplishment.
An awareness of cultural differences might also temper overoptimistic progress r fallacy of short- term solutions to long- term problems and caution against unre last century, the United States has intervened militarily in several countries t 9 of 12 3/ 11/ 98 12: 32 PM
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establishing democratic governments backed by professional military forces patte model. These objectives may be essential for gaining public support for overseas troops on the ground who quickly realize- and often pay the price for- imposing countries whose historical odyssey has taken them in other directions.
The themes and patterns discussed here are by no means exhaustive of those to be nontraditional operations. What this article suggests is that the task of better OOTW can be furthered by a thorough analysis of the historical record, first to analogies, patterns and recurring themes and second to understand the implicatio and future operations. This comprehensive approach to the historical record is a that cannot be performed on the eve of deployment. Rather, it should be an integ professional education. At the least, an officer should possess an in- depth awa studies relating to nontraditional operations. 17
All US officers- especially those in the combat arms- preparing to participate i should deploy with a mind- set at odds with much of what they have been taught a be prepared to see many traditional assumptions of their profession violated. Th clear guidance, at least not while a situation is still highly fluid, but should They should not expect to operate in a political vacuum, even at the tactical le expect to find themselves in a black- and- white " morality play" pitted against enemy located across a clearly demarcated line. They should expect changing and and tasks, but should not expect to be allowed to use every means at their dispo missions. They should expect to be ordered to perform tasks for which they have They should expect to be called on to demonstrate restraint, together with a kee considerations and to alien cultures, either or both of which they might find re They should expect ambiguity, fluidity, constraints, dejection, frustration and should expect the worst. If these expectations are not realized, they will be pl worst does occur, officers and soldiers will be better prepared to deal with the
1. US Department of the Army, Field Manual ( FM) 100- 5: Operations ( Washington Headquarters, Department of the Army, 1993), 13- 0.
2. Doctrine categorizes interventions such as Operation Just Cause in Panama as they entail armed conflict. But the combat, while often extensive and intensive, and over in a matter of hours or a few days at most, after which noncombat tasks From another perspective, to categorize these contingency operations as " limite put them on an equal footing with Korea and Vietnam. For these reasons, and with minimizing the combat experience of the participants, I and others would place s operations other than war ( OOTW). Doctrine itself concedes that OOTW will not a actions. See FM 100- 5, 2- 1, 13- 2.
3. This figure is by no means comprehensive, nor does it employ today's doctrina might dispute the placement of specific operations or wars in certain categories argued that certain Vietnam war aspects qualify it as unconventional warfare rat conflict. These qualifications aside, however, the figure is designed to demonst nontraditional, unorthodox operations in US military history.
4. For a discussion on how nontraditional, unorthodox operations have been categ 1980s and the implications thereof, see David Fastabend, " The Categorization of ( Summer 1997), 75- 87. It is not my intention in this article to debate termino Therefore, I chose to use the terms " nontraditional operations" and " unorthodo 10 of 12 3/ 11/ 98 12: 32 PM
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evocative manner and leave precise definitions to others.
5. One succinct argument for the relevancy of the Marine experience in Haiti in century can be found in LTC Thomas Adams' " Intervention in Haiti: Lessons Relea Review
( September- October 1996), 45- 56.
6. For a more detailed discussion of force protection issues in Bosnia and Haiti Walter Kretchik and MAJ Robert Shaw in this issue. It has been suggested that th Mountain Division ( Light) [ 10th MD ( L)] in Operation Restore Hope, the first in Somalia, might have been a more apt analogy to apply to Haiti and Bosnia than experience as the quick reaction force during the UN phase of the Somalia operat which the 3 October fire fight took place.
7. Richard E. Neustadt and Ernest R. May,
Thinking in Time: The Uses of History for Decisionmakers
( New York: The Free Press, 1986). Generally, historians and political scientist as a matter of course. Douglas Pike, one of America's leading authorities on Vie was once asked what he would advise to ensure a successful outcome to the US cou in El Salvador in the 1980s. The question assumed, of course, that the war in Vi analogy to the war in El Salvador. Pike answered by noting the tremendous differ cases and concluded by saying that his advice would be to remove all Vietnam vet Salvador.
8. The patterns and themes presented here have been selected because they reveal differ in kind or degree from conventional operations. Thus, problems involving planning, intelligence, logistics, joint and combined operations and so forth wi they illuminate some significant difference between the two kinds of operations. they are not present in OOTW.
9. Remarks of a Marine Corps general officer ( In accordance with Command and Ge nonattrition policy for statements by visiting speakers, further reference will Leavenworth, Kansas. The search for enemies can have a constructive, as well as brigade commander in Haiti employed traditional terminology in an innovative way " enemy" as anyone impeding him from accomplishing his mission. On a given day, the mayor of a town, the local priest or a fellow officer up the chain of comman meant finding imaginative ways, well short of deadly force, to overcome the impe problem arising from a conventional view of the enemy is the disorientation expe operations requiring them to work alongside forces clearly regarded as hostile. Panama, where as soon as major combat operations against the Panamanian Defense ended, US soldiers found themselves patrolling the streets of Panama City with a people who, just a few days before, they had been trying to kill or had been try were now being reconstituted as the new Panamanian police force. Many US soldier talked about the difficulty of the adjustment they had to make and about the wis arms a few steps behind a Panamanian. In Haiti, there was no combat, but US sold expressed some initial confusion and wariness about working with General Raoul C of the Haitian armed forces ( FAd'H), an organization that had been targeted for contingency plans for combat operations in the country. Given the situation's am arose within the US military, specifically between Special Forces and 10th MD ( Port- au- Prince, on just how to interact with members of this " hostile" and de
10. On the issue of military- nongovernmental organizations/ private volunteer o and the " cultural differences" that impede cooperation, see COL Guy C. Swan III Nongovernmental Organization- Military Gap," Military Review ( September- Octobe
11. Roger J. Spiller,
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Not War But Like War': The American Intervention in Lebanon, Leavenworth Paper No. 3 ( Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1981), 20- 22, 24- Lebanon, where the ambassador established his authority only after a near miss w
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American ambassador to the Dominican Republic clearly dictated when and where US come ashore in 1965. The civilian and military chains of command remained separa but the Pentagon used the military chain to notify ranking officers on the scene ambassador's instructions. The early phase of the operation had its share of pro were related to a breakdown in political- military cooperation and coordination.
12. Lawrence A. Yates, Power Pack: U. S. Intervention in the Dominican Republic, Leavenworth Paper No. 15 ( Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1988) Dominican Republic, the US forces' mission changed frequently in response to the opposite was true during the Marine operation in Beirut from 1982 to 1984. There but the mission remained the same, with tragic consequences. There is, of course of being deployed with no mission at all. The Eisenhower administration's troop Lebanon in 1958 offers an example of this possibility. The crisis' urgency seeme military response, but because the situation was unclear and unstable, determini remained an open question while the administration assessed day- to- day develop the US Army troop commander arriving in Lebanon greeted them by admitting, " Wha mission may be, I cannot tell you." Historians have judged the Lebanon intervent political- military operation. It is difficult today to imagine US troops being open- ended situation with such limited guidance.
13. Remarks of Marine general, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
14. One example may serve to illustrate this last point. Rangers in Just Cause c camouflage paint after the fighting had ended, and one of their primary missions restoration of security and stability. After a few days, it became apparent that negative effect on the local citizens, the vast majority of whom supported the U Given the new and, for many Rangers, frustrating noncombat mission, the decision to drop the camouflage. Rules against accepting food from the grateful Panamania however, lest the locals come to expect something in return.
15. Remarks of Marine general, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
16. Stanley Karnow,
In Our Image: America's Empire in the Philippines
( New York: Random House,
1989), 348; Remarks of Marine general, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
17. A suggested reading list for nontraditional US military operations in the 20 the " Bookshelf" section of this issue.
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